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Abstract 
 
This paper examines how changes in immigration policy levers actually affect the skill 
characteristics of immigrant arrivals using a unique Canadian immigrant landings 
database. We first review the Canadian experience with a point system as part of its 
immigrant policy. Section III of the paper describes some overall patterns of immigrant 
arrivals since 1980. Section IV identifies some relevant hypotheses on the possible 
effects on immigrant skill characteristics of the total immigration rate, the point system 
weights and immigrant class weights. The “skill” admissions examined are level of 
education, age, and fluency in either English or French. Regressions are then used to test 
the hypotheses from Canadian landings data. It is found that (i) the larger the inflow rate 
of immigrants the lower the average skill level of the arrivals; (ii) increasing the 
proportion of skill-evaluated immigrants raises average skill levels; (iii) increasing point 
system weights on a specific skill dimension indeed has the intended effect of raising 
average skill levels in this dimension among arriving principal applicants; and (iv) 
increasing the proportion of skill-evaluated immigrants appears to have the strongest 
effects among the immigration policy levers.   3
I.  Introduction 
The 1990s have seen major changes in immigration policy in Canada, one of the leading 
immigrant-receiving countries and the one with the highest per capita immigration rate in 
the world. Total immigration levels, for example, were kept relatively high over the full 
business cycle rather than following the previous tap-on/tap-off approach when total 
immigration levels were linked to absorptive capacity over the business cycle; there was 
a shift away from an emphasis on family-class immigrants and family reunification role 
towards an emphasis on independent economic-class immigrants (and their dependants) 
and a skill-development role for immigration; and there was a major change in the point 
system (under which economic-class immigrants are evaluated for entry) away from 
specific occupational preferences and towards broader emphasis on educational 
credentials, language facility and young families, again with an eye to human capital and 
skills development of the host country. Indeed, a recent proposal by the federal 
government would see a rise in the total immigration rate by about 100 thousand per year 
or by about 35 percent within 5 years (Campion-Smith, 2005) to help offset the aging of 
the Canadian population and to contribute to social security and health care costs, and to 
help supply needed skills and enhance productivity for a growing economy.  
A number of other countries such as the United Kingdom, Spain, and Germany 
are also considering or in the process of bringing in a point system as part of a plan to 
shift their immigration policies more towards a skill-based focus and possibly to provide 
tighter control on total inflows. The international competition to attract skilled 
immigrants is evidently increasing and more attention is being devoted to a point-system 
approach to evaluate the desirable characteristics of prospective immigrants. While the   4
United States has traditionally emphasized more the role of family reunification in its 
immigration policy, some debate has initiated over possible adoption of a point system. 
So it is worthwhile to investigate what lessons can be offered from Canadian experience 
with their point system and broader inflow policy levers. Any guidelines for reform of 
immigration policy (Chiswick, 1981) or design for an optimal immigration policy 
(McHale, 2003) would need to take into account how effective immigration policy levers 
actually are in bringing about their stated policy objectives. 
Canada, like other major immigrant-receiving countries such as Australia, is also 
currently rethinking the criteria and point weights built into their respective point 
systems. There are a number of concerns arising from Canada’s current emphasis on lots 
of education human capital: there are real problems with labor market recognition of 
foreign credentials, increased agglomeration of recent immigrants in three large urban 
areas (Toronto, Vancouver and Montreal), and a significantly slower rate of assimilation 
of recent cohorts of immigrants into the Canadian labor market (Aydemir and Skuterud, 
2005; and Picot and Sweetman, 2005). Reitz (2205), among others, provides a call for a 
new immigration strategy for Canada to improve the utilization of immigrants’ skills. 
There are lessons to be learned and insights to be offered to U.S. immigration policy from 
the Canadian experience over the 1980s and 1990s. 
A vast literature has developed on evaluating the economic outcome of 
immigrants in their adopted country (see, for example in the case of Canada, Chiswick 
and Miller, 1988; Baker and Benjamin, 1994; Bloom et. al., 1995; Grant, 1999; and 
Aydemir and Sweetman, 2005). One of the dimensions of this literature has been on how 
these outcomes differ by arrival class of immigrants (Duleep and Regets, 1992, 1996;   5
Jasso and Rosenzweig, 1995; de Silva, 1997; Miller, 1999; Abbott and Dougherty, 2004; 
and Chiswick, Lee and Miller, 2005, 2006). For example, does the skill-selected class of 
immigrants assimilate more rapidly into local labor markets and get ahead more quickly 
in terms of earnings, local language proficiency, occupational composition, or incidence 
of unemployment? But one can view the channels of immigrant adjustment to policy 
levers, such as skill testing, as having two quite distinct stages. The first is how the policy 
levers affect the cohort of immigrant arrivals into the host country. The second stage is 
how these arrivals succeed (or otherwise) in their adopted environment. The great 
majority of literature has focused on the second stage of this process. The current paper 
examines the first stage. 
This first-stage process involves several sources of decision-making or behavior. 
One is the obvious set of government policy levers. Another is the pull of relatives and 
job opportunities in the host country to potential immigrants from abroad – if you wish, 
the host country’s demand for immigrants. But in addition, there is the decision on the 
part of potential immigrants from abroad of whether they choose to immigrate, and, at 
least within the skilled immigrant class, where to immigrate – if you wish, the supply of 
immigrants. Matters such as economic conditions obviously affect both the pull for 
additional labor and the attractiveness of the country to such immigrant labor (see Borjas, 
1999b, pp. 1709-1717 for more technical details). As international competition for such 
skilled labor increases, the host country’s attractiveness has to be viewed increasingly 
within the context of other possible substitute destinations. Other countries’ immigration 
policies and world events can also affect the supply of applicants to Canada.   6
The general question we want to look at in this paper is how responsive are the 
major characteristics of arrival cohorts of immigrants to changes in immigration policy 
rules. We make use of a fairly unique administrative data source put together by 
Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), the federal immigration department, that 
contains landing data on all arriving immigrants to Canada over the years 1980-2001 – 
the so-called Canadian Landings Database (or CLD). The major features of this data 
source are discussed in Section IV below. It allows us to test and empirically evaluate 
several hypotheses on how changes in Canadian immigration policy rules over this period 
result in changed characteristics of the arriving immigrants. In particular, Canada 
implemented quite major policy changes on total immigration levels (in the mid 1980s) 
and on shifting emphasis between family-class and economic-class immigrants and on 
substantially revised point allocation schemes in their point system (both in the mid 
1990s). The skill characteristics and source-country mix of immigrants also changed 
quite dramatically over this period. We thus want to estimate reduced-form equations to 
investigate whether these three sets of policy changes have had identifiable effects on the 
characteristics of arriving immigrants.  
To the authors’ awareness, there are very few studies of the effects of immigration 
policy levers – and specifically of a point system – on the resulting skill characteristics of 
arriving immigrants, and this is the only paper to do so in detailed empirical fashion.
1 
Jasso, Rosenzweig and Smith (1997) examine the question of how the number and skill 
of immigrants to the U.S. are likely to be influenced by economic and social conditions in 
source and destination countries, and by immigration laws and selection criteria in the 
U.S. The discussion provides a general analytical framework and some regression results   7
on earnings of some specific groups of immigrant males over 1972-1990 for the United 
States. Green and Green (1995) examine the effects of changes in Canadian immigration 
policy on the occupational composition of immigrants. Aydemir (2002) looks at the 
effects of selection criteria and economic opportunities on the characteristics of Canadian 
immigrants from the perspective of the potential immigrant. He provides a structural 
analysis of the separate application decisions and the application review outcome. 
Chiswick and Miller (2005a) use a difference-in-difference approach to empirically 
isolate the impact of English language skills policy changes in Australian panel survey 
data. They find that an increased English skill requirement among essentially independent 
class immigrants appears to have indeed raised English language proficiency among such 
immigrants. 
 
II.  A Comparative Perspective on Canadian and American Immigration Policy, 1980 
to 2004 
 
Immigration regulations have played a central role in shaping immigration to Canada and 
other major immigrant-receiving countries for much of the last century.  The evolution of 
immigration policy between Canada and the United States has followed very different 
paths. In what follows, we briefly sketch the outcomes of these different approaches as 
they are  reflected in current policy prescriptions. 
 
II.1 Canada 
Canada adopted a non-discriminatory admission policy in 1962 a few years ahead of the 
United States (in 1965). Both countries had operated a discriminatory policy before these 
changes focussing on arrivals from traditional source countries. The shift to a universal   8
immigration policy then opened up the possibility of new arrivals coming from any 
country and from any background. 
  For Canada this shift to a universal immigration policy created problems on the 
skill level of the new arrivals. In the 1960's, Canada was in the process of shifting 
towards a more urban-industrial economy and the labor force had to be brought into line 
with the skill levels needed to support this transition. Immigration policy had to be 
shifted as well. The solution was the creation of the Point System (in 1967), as an 
objective way to assess the admissibility of prospective immigrants while at the same 
time up-grading the skill level of new arrivals. 
  Table 1 sets out the categories under which a prospective Independent  candidate 
for admission is judged along with the maximum number of points in each factor and the 
pass mark needed to be admitted. The table covers the period from the introduction of the 
Point System in 1967 until the present. Despite major revisions to the Immigration Act 
over the last three decades (i.e., in 1978 and 2002), the Point System has remained at the 
core of assessing which Independent (or Economic) class immigrants will obtain entry 
visas. The Independent class also includes business class immigrants – formally added in 
1986 – in the entrepreneur, investor and self-employment categories. Two other major 
classes under which prospective immigrants can be admitted are the Family class (family 
reunification), and the Humanitarian class (mainly refugees). The Family class migrants 
are admitted solely on the basis of kinship. A Nominated or assisted relatives class was 
also introduced as part of the Independent class. Admission under this latter class was 
partly through kinship and partly through the assessment under the Point System. Bonus 
points were awarded to prospective immigrants seeking entrance through this class as a   9
result of having relatives already resident in Canada who could help with adapting to 
their new home. There are also a small number of “other immigrants” consisting largely 
of retired persons, live-in caregivers or foreign household domestics or deferred removal-
order immigrants. 
  Under the Point System, prospective immigrants originally needed to amass at 
least 50 out of a possible 100 points to obtain an entry visas (nominated relatives received 
a 15 point bonus to cover a short-fall in points earned in evaluating their case for 
admission). As Table 1 shows, prospective immigrants were judged on a wide variety of 
factors, for example, age, education, work experience, occupational demand, etc. Table 1 
also shows that the weights assigned to these factors have changed over time. Indeed, 
some categories actually disappeared while new ones were introduced. Initially, at least, 
the weighting scheme for the first two decades after the introduction of this scheme in 
1967 reflected past immigration policy in the sense that it focused on occupational needs 
in the economy at a particular point of time. The total number of points awarded to 
occupational-directed categories (i.e., occupational skill, experience, occupational 
demand, and bonus points for designated occupations) totalled 43 out of a possible 100 
points in 1986. The prospective migrant needed to get a certain number of points out of 
100 to be admitted to Canada. It is not necessary to get points in every category. Hence a 
prospective migrant could score high points for education, age, etc., and zero for 
occupation demand, and still be admitted. 
  The occupational-based or gap-filling model used to guide admission was 
changed in the mid-nineties. In its place was substituted an earnings or human capital 
model perspective. Under this approach, specific occupational  needs were reduced in the   10
weighting scheme while additional points were awarded to education, age and official  
language fluency (all three of these categories had been present from 1967 but were given 
lower weights than those categories dealing with occupational demand). The rationale for 
the change was that the higher prospective immigrants scored in these three categories 
the more easily they would adapt to their new home country and hence the more rapid 
their ascent to parity in earnings to similarly placed native-born workers. Thus by the 
mid-nineties, education, facility in one or both of the native languages (i.e., English and 
French) and age accounted for 59 of the 100 total points, with only 67 points needed for 
the pass mark. 
  This shift in weights in Canada signalled a move towards a longer-run view of 
immigration policy. Less emphasis was placed on gap filling and more on the factors that 
supposedly influenced the long-run adaptability of the new migrant. Along with this 
change went a shift away from an absorptive capacity model (i.e., where the annual 
immigration flow was adjusted to short-run economic conditions, with an increase in the 
inflow as unemployment fell and a reduction in the number admitted as economic 
conditions deteriorated). In its place was put a model that set annual immigration levels at 
a bit less than one percent of the Canadian population. This number would not change 
with short-run economic conditions. Hence, as the government sought to increase the 
skilled share of arrivals, it also shifted immigration policy to a long-run approach, and 
one based on adaptability rather than one designed to meet short-run occupational  needs. 
  It is worth mentioning some key features of the Canadian immigration system. 
Under the terms of the British North American Act establishing Canada, immigration is 
designated as a co-jurisdiction between the provinces and the federal government (i.e.,   11
the provinces can have a say in setting policy). Since 1978, Quebec has run its own 
policy (subject to federal override), with its own Point System. Second, while Australia 
sets a maximum age for admission of independent migrants at 49, Canada reduces points 
available to migrants less than 21 and over 49 (Richardson and Lester, 2004). Third, 
while under Australian immigration policy, prospective immigrants must score at least 
one point in every category, Canada requires only that the prospective migrant score 
enough points to meet the passing grade and so can still be admitted with a zero score in 
any given category. Finally, Canada does not try to assess whether the skills recorded by 
the prospective immigrant will be recognized in Canada. The only action taken is to 
inform the migrant of the education/training needed to meet the requirements for 
employment in their particular occupation (i.e., physician, nurse, engineer, carpenter, 
etc.). This is in marked contrast with the Australian approach which is to match the 
migrant’s training to the position before admission is granted (i.e., the migrant is 
acceptable and can move into the job). In Canada, therefore, the problem of 
credentialization has become, in recent times, an area of media attention and controversy. 
 
II.2 The  United  States 
Since the passage of the Immigration Act of 1924 and the 1965 Amendments to the Act, 
the United States has followed a dramatically different path in regulating immigration 
than Canada. (For a summary of U.S. immigration policy, see Chap. 2 of Smith and 
Edmonston, 1997.) The most outstanding differences are (i) U.S. immigration policy has 
in the main followed a family reunification approach rather than one based on economic 
factors. (ii) The level of inflow, until the last quarter century, was low relative to the size   12
of the population and the annual inflow of 180,000 was fixed and independent of short-
run economic conditions in the U.S. Throughout the post-World War II period, the 
number of legal immigrants increased. It is just in the last quarter of the 20th century that 
the number of legally admitted immigrants has climbed to nearly a million migrants a 
year. This formed the basis of the “New Migration”. (iii) Unlike Canada, U.S. 
immigration policy is highly centralized under federal government control; hence, it 
operates a single policy that applies to all states. (iv) The 1924 Act was, as in the case of 
Canada, highly discriminatory. It focused on reuniting families already in the U.S. and so 
minimized the inflow of less desirable immigrants from southern and eastern Europe, and 
continued the policy of virtually barring Asian immigrants. Migration to the U.S., 
although more widely geographically-based than was the case for Canada, nevertheless, 
favored immigration from traditional source countries like Northwest Europe. The United 
States ended its racist admission policy in 1965 and at the same time raised the annual 
level of intake. 
  As a result of adopting a non-economic-based immigration policy (i.e., one 
centered on family reunification), U.S. immigration policy cannot effectively control for 
the level of human capital inflow. It still attracts some of the most skilled immigrants 
from around the world, but the average level of skill is probably lower than that of either 
Australia or Canada. Recently, the U.S. government has taken steps to rectify this short-
fall in the share of skilled immigrants coming to that country. In 1998, the government 
increased the cap on long-stay professional visas (H-1B) and it did so again in 2000 
under pressure from the high-tech industries. Also, the 1990 Act expanded the number of   13
employment preference permanent immigration visas, though the overall policy approach 
remained focussed on family reunification. 
  A skill-based point system was first proposed for the United States by Chiswick 
(1981). Recently, Borjas (1999a) proposed that immigration levels be dropped to half 
their present level and that the U.S. government adopt a modified point system along the 
lines of that used in Australia and Canada. Borjas proposes that prospective migrants be 
assessed in three categories (i.e., English language proficiency, years of schooling, and 
age). No weights were assigned for each of these categories. The United States, however, 
is still operating a non-economic (family reunification) policy with a gap-filling or 
targeted employment model for selecting economic immigrants and with few policy tools 
available to it to adjust the composition of the inflow to a more economic and skill-based 
orientation.  
 
III.  Canadian Immigrant Landings Since 1980: General Features 
Before formulating specific hypotheses to be examined, consider some of the main 
features of Canadian immigration inflows since 1980. The descriptive results in this 
section are based largely on published data – hard copy or web-based – from Citizenship 
and Immigration Canada (Immigration Statistics and Facts and Figures, various years) 
from their landings data. Figure 1 shows the profile of total immigration levels since 
1980. In 1985, the total number of immigrants troughed at 84.3 thousand. The number 
then shot up in 1987 to 152.1 thousand and continued rising to above 250 thousand in 
1992 and 1993. It then drifted down to 173.1 thousand in 1998 and then moved up again 
to above 250 thousand in 2001, from which it has continued in the 220-230 thousand   14
immigrants per year range (out of a population of about 30 million). The main feature of 
these results is the distinct up-shift in total immigration levels in Canada beginning in the 
mid-1980s that has generally continued. 
  Figure 1 also shows the numbers of immigrants in the major immigrant classes. 
The two largest classes are the Family class and the Economic (or Independent) class. 
The latter includes all dependants arriving with the principal applicant. It also includes 
Assisted or Nominated Relatives since they also pass through the Point System. The 
things to notice here are, first, the marked cyclical nature of Economic class inflows 
which generally increase in periods of economic growth and prosperity in Canada and 
decrease during periods of recessions (1981-83 and 1990-92). This suggests that we will 
need to be cognizant of arguments related to the attractiveness of Canada to potential 
immigrants as quite distinct from any immediate immigration policy levers that Canadian 
authorities may change. And second, note the general decline in Family class numbers 
since 1993. 
  Since 1980, there has also been substantial change in the country or region of 
origin of Canadian immigrants (see Figure 2). The most noticeable change here has been 
the increase in the numbers arriving from the Asia and Pacific regions and, to a lesser 
though still significant degree, from Africa and the Middle East. In the mid-1980s, the 
numbers of immigrants arriving from Asia and Pacific ran around 30-35 thousand a year, 
but by 1992 had moved up to over 100 thousand a year and peaked in 2001 at about 133 
thousand arrivals. Those from Africa and the Middle East in the early to mid-1980s 
averaged around 8-9 thousand a year, but by 1991 moved up to over 40 thousand, and 
since 2000 arrivals have run between 40 and 50 thousand a year. Meanwhile, landings   15
from Europe, United Kingdom and the United States have been relatively stable over the 
whole period with 41.8 thousand from Europe and the U.K. and 7.5 thousand from the 
U.S. in 2004. In percentages terms, though, they represent a declining share of the total 
inflow. There have also been fluctuations in the numbers arriving from South and Central 
America which averaged 14-17 thousand a year in the early 1980s, then moved up to 37 
thousand by 1991 and have since eased off to 19-22 thousand a year since 2001. 
  More detail on the source country breakdown of immigrants from Asia and the 
Pacific is provided in Figure 3. Here one can see the run up of immigrants in the early to 
mid-1990s from Hong Kong (from about 6 thousand a year from the early 1980s to a 
peak of 44 thousand in 1994, then a substantial easing off after 1997 when the hand-over 
occurred, down to only 1.5 thousand in 2004). The inflows from India and Pakistan pretty 
steadily increased from the mid-1980s (eg., 4.5 thousand in total in 1985) through to the 
early 2000s (totalling 43 thousand in 2001 and 38 thousand in 2004). Again, though, the 
biggest change has been arrivals from mainland China which varied from 2 to 6 thousand 
in the early to mid-1980s, then over the early 1990s moved up to 20 thousand a year, and 
in 2001 hit 40 thousand landings and has since eased off slightly. 
  In contrast, the intended region of destination within Canada has not changed that 
much since 1980. Most migrants (over 80%) move directly to urban areas on arriving in 
Canada, so that patterns of settlement are dominated by migration to Toronto for Ontario, 
to Montreal for Quebec, and to Vancouver for British Columbia. Ontario absorbs over 
half (52.1% over the period), of all migrants coming to Canada and it has held this 
position for the last twenty years. The next largest regions of intended destination are 
Quebec (16.6%) and British Columbia (16.6% as well). Given that the population size of   16
British Columbia is much smaller than that of either Ontario or Quebec, the result is that 
the rate of migration to the west coast province is quite high. Ontario is indeed the only 
province that has witnessed a rise in its share of total immigration over the last two 
decades. The share going to this province grew from about 44 percent in the early 
eighties to a high of 60 percent in 2000. The Quebec and British Columbia percentages of 
arrivals, on the other hand, fluctuate around a trendless share of total arrivals to each 
province. Both the Prairies (Manitoba and Saskatchewan) and Alberta show declining 
shares over the covered period with most of the drop occurring in the late 1980's and then 
holding constant for the reminder of the period. This is a surprising result, at least for 
Alberta, since this province is one of the most prosperous and high-growth regions in 
Canada and has attracted a large internal migration to the oil fields and to the rapidly 
expanding cities of Calgary and Edmonton. 
  Now consider some of the skill characteristics of landed immigrants since 1980. 
In Table 2, sample means are presented for education and admission class for immigrants 
landed in Canada in 1980, 1990 and 2000.  The proportion of immigrants with an 
undergraduate or graduate university degree rose dramatically over the period from 5.8 
percent and 1.8 percent, respectively, in 1980 to 25.1 percent and 9.0 percent in 2000.  
The larger part of each increase occurred in the 1990s and is almost surely due to the 
reform of the Point System used to select immigrants to Canada under the skilled worker 
or Economic class category of admission.  The changes in 1993 specifically led to a large 
increase in the weight placed on university education in selecting skilled immigrants.  
  In contrast, the proportion of new immigrants with post-secondary education 
below the university level rose from 16.5 percent in 1980 to 20 percent in 1990.     17
However, it declined back to below its 1980 level at 15.6 percent by 2000. The other 
large change in the education distribution of newly landed immigrants over the period is 
the decline at the secondary education level – from 59 percent in 1980 to 35 percent in 
2000. The overall result has been a fairly steady increase in the average years of 
education of arriving immigrants (see Figure 4). 
  The distribution of new immigrants across the different admission categories has 
also varied considerably over the twenty year period.  The proportion of new immigrants 
in the Economic category rose form 34.9 percent in 1980 to 44.2 percent in 1990 then to 
58.7 percent in 2000. These increases coincided with decreases in the share of new 
immigrants arriving under the Family class (35.9 percent in 1980 to 26.6 percent in 2000) 
and the Humanitarian class (28.2 percent in 1980 to 13.2 percent in 2000). The larger part 
of the decline in the share of the Humanitarian category occurred between 1980 and 
1990, while the larger part of the decline in the Family class (and the increase in the share 
of the Economic category) occurred between 1990 and 2000. The Humanitarian class 
intakes are, of course, largely influenced by refugee crises around the world. 
  In Table 3, the sample proportions for the different education levels are presented 
for the case of immigrants arriving under the Economic category.  The percentage of 
Economic immigrants with either a post-graduate or undergraduate degrees rose 
dramatically over the period from 3.3 and 9.0 percent, respectively, in 1980 to 13.4 
percent and 33.6 percent, respectively, in 2000 (with most of the increase in each case 
occurring in the 1990s). The percentage of new Economic immigrants arriving with 
education at the post-secondary level (below university) and the secondary level fell over   18
the period by just under 10 percentage points in the former case and 26 percentage points 
in the latter case.  
  In Table 4, the equivalent sample proportions are presented as those in Table 3 
but for the restricted sample of immigrants arriving under the Economic category who 
were indeed the principal applicants.  These are the immigrants to Canada who are 
actually selected on their perceived labor market skills since admission under the Point 
System over the relevant time period was restricted to the characteristics of the principal 
applicant (and not those of accompanying family members).  The results are presented for 
the years 1990 and 2000 since this is the period over which most of the changes occurred 
in terms of: i) the allocation of points for education, and ii) the distribution of education 
of new arrivals under the Economic category.  From the first two columns, we see that 
there was a massive increase in the share of immigrants arriving with a university degree 
between 1990 and 2000 (from 9.0 percent and 23.0 percent for post-graduate and 
undergraduate, respectively, to 24.7 percent and 53.6 percent).  These increases came at 
the expense of the share of Economic principal applicants entering with only some post-
secondary and especially secondary levels of education. 
  Equivalent sample means are presented in the next four columns for the case of 
immigrants landing in Quebec and immigrants landing in Ontario in Table 4. These are 
the two most populous provinces in Canada.  Also worth noting is that the provincial 
government in Quebec has an arrangement with the federal government allowing them to 
choose the points awarded for different characteristics under the Point System allowing 
them to have a strong say in terms of selecting the immigrants planning to reside in 
Quebec. The main motive for doing this is to increase the proportion of immigrants going   19
to Quebec who are likely to live and work using the French language since this is the 
dominant language in Quebec. 
  It is interesting to note that the large increases in education over the period appear 
for both immigrants settling in Quebec and those settling in Ontario. However, the 
increases at the post-graduate and especially the undergraduate university levels are 
larger for the case of Ontario than they are for Quebec.  Parent and Worswick (2003) 
argue that the increase in the share of immigrants with high levels of education coming to 
Quebec in the latter half of the 1990s rose because of the increased emphasis placed on 
education under the Quebec portion of the selection system, but that it did not rise by as 
much as what occurred in the rest of Canada because of the emphasis on French language 
ability in the Quebec selection system.   
  In Figure 5, the annual share of new immigrants with a university degree is 
presented for new Economic principal applicants landing in Quebec, the “Rest of 
Canada” (ROC), and Ontario. It is clear for all three groups that the share of new 
immigrants with a university degree rose over the period with the increase beginning 
roughly in 1994.  The increases in ROC and in Ontario are also larger than those 
experienced in Quebec. The descriptive evidence gives strong support for the idea that 
the parameters of the Canadian skilled immigrant selection systems can have noticeable 
impacts on the composition of immigrants landing under the Economic admission 
category.  
  If age and particularly youthfulness are interpreted as a proxy for flexibility and 
adaptability to the Canadian labor market and likely accompaniment by a young family, 
then average age of immigrant arrivals may also be viewed as a skill characteristic.   20
Figure 6 shows how average age of arriving migrants has declined slightly since 1980. 
But the major pattern here is a cyclical one: average age of arriving cohorts increases in 
recessions (early 1980s and early 1990s) and decreases in periods of economic 
expansions. This is fully consistent with the previously observed cyclical pattern of the 
inflow of Economic class immigrants. The average age of Economic class immigrants 
over the period is 26.3 years while that for non-Economic class arrivals is 31.6 years of 
age (with overall average of 29.3 years). In expansions, Canada is more attractive to 
skilled prospective immigrants who are relatively young with young families and this 
brings down the average age of arrivals. But in recessions, Canada is less attractive to 
such immigrants and the number of Economic class immigrants attenuates, while the 
stock of resident immigrants continues to bring in relatives under the Family class 
category and these relations are typically parents and grandparents and hence 
substantially older. 
  A further feature to notice in Figure 6, is that there appears to be a reversal or 
relaxation of the above cyclical pattern after 1998. That is, the Canadian economy 
continued to grow well with very little slowdown (particularly relative to the United 
States) right through from the middle 1990s to the 2000s. So one would expect a 
continuing decrease in the average age of arrivals. Evidently this has not happened. In the 
mid-1990s, however, the Point System was revised to give greater weight to “experience” 
and “years of schooling”, and both these changes would tend to push up the average age 
at arrival. Also, after 1997, the inflow of immigrants from Hong Kong fell off 
dramatically and they were typically relatively young.    21
  Finally, also consider the language fluency in either English or French of arriving 
immigrants. While this skill attribute is self-reported, it is checked or confirmed by the 
visa-issuing immigration officer. As shown in Figure 7, there has been a mixed pattern in 
language proficiency over time. Fluency in English or French has risen slightly from the 
mid-1980s, but then has slipped a bit since 1996. On average over the period, 47.4 
percent of immigrants are proficient in English, 4.6 percent in French, and a further 3.8 
percent as bilingual in English and French. About 44 percent are proficient in neither 
official language upon arrival (see Table 5). Not surprisingly, fluency in English or 
French is greater among Economic class immigrants than in other classes, so less than 36 
percent of Economic class arrivals are fluent in neither official language, but almost 51 
percent of non-Economic class immigrants lack such proficiency. 
 
IV.  Testing Hypotheses on Immigration Policy Levers and Landings Characteristics 
We now try to pull some of the previous descriptive results and policy discussions 
together in terms of identifying specific hypotheses and testing them in the framework of 
regression analysis. A number of papers, including most recently Card (2005), Ottaviano 
and Peri (2005) and Fougère et. al. (2003), have used quite different approaches to find 
broad positive effects of total immigration flows on the U.S. and Canadian economies. 
Fougère et. al. (2005) finds that increasing the proportion of high-skilled (i.e., Economic 
class) immigrants would, in the long run, raise Canadian labor productivity and living 
standards and reduce the expected negative impact of population aging on growth of real 
GDP per capita. And Worswick (2004) provides a call for reweighting the Point System 
so as to reward applicants for education credentials and relevant work experience which   22
are recognized by Canadian employers. Consequently, the three drivers or policy levers 
we wish to examine in this study are: (i) the total level of immigrant inflows in a year, (ii) 
the proportion of the total inflow in the Economic class category, and (iii) the Point 
System weights for the general skill levels of educational attainment, (youthful) age, and 
(English/French) language fluency. In the Canadian Point System, zero points are 
awarded for a principal applicant having less than a high school diploma, maximum 
points for a four-year university degree, and partial points for various types of high 
school and post-secondary training. In the case of age, full points are awarded for 
principal applicant’s age between 21 and 49, and decreasing partial points for age further 
away from the 21-49 age interval. In the case of language, zero points are awarded if the 
principal applicant speaks English and French very haltingly, full points if they are fluent 
in both official languages, and partial points based on reading, writing and speaking of 
English and French. 
Administrative data on immigrant landings are employed in the analysis of this 
paper.  Each record in the Canadian Landings Database (CLD) contains the information 
available from the immigrant’s landing documents at the time of receiving “Landed 
Immigrant” status in Canada.  The microdata set contains landings records for every 
immigrant who arrived in Canada over the period 1980 through 2001; it is thus very 
large. The data have detailed information on the immigrant’s age, sex, education, official 
language fluency status, marital status, visa status, country of birth, intended destination, 
and place of arrival as well as whether the person was the principal applicant (versus an 
accompanying family member).
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The dependent variables or outcome variables for the regression analysis are three 
sets of skill indicator variables for educational attainment (both number of years of 
education and the percent of immigrant arrivals with a university degree), years of age, 
and official language fluency (percentage arriving with English or French language 
fluency). These three dimensions are generally acknowledged as the major skill 
indicators for immigrants that the literature focuses on, and these are three that Borjas 
(1999a) has suggested that United States immigration policy should also incorporate in a 
prospective Point System. 
 
IV.1  Basic Hypotheses of Interest 
Several hypotheses are examined in this paper relevant to the effect on arriving 
immigrants’ skill levels of our three policy drivers. The first refers to total immigration 
inflow rates: does a larger size of immigrant inflows reduce the overall skill levels of 
arriving cohorts as the larger numbers of immigrants are likely to be closer to the Point 
System cut-off line (in the case of Economic class immigrants) and to bring in more 
relatives (in the case of Family class immigrants) who generally adjust more slowly in 
integrating into the Canadian labor market? The second refers to Economic vs non-
Economic class immigrants: do Economic class immigrants have higher average skill 
levels, and thus other things being equal, does an increase in the share of Economic class 
immigrants in response to shifting government priorities raise the overall skill levels of 
arriving immigrant cohorts since it is the Economic class arrivals who are essentially 
admitted on the basis of their skill? The third hypothesis refers to operation of the Point 
System: does increasing the Point System weight on some skill dimension – such as   24
educational attainment – indeed have the desired effect of raising overall skill levels of 
immigrant arrivals in this dimension? And the fourth refers to business cycle effects: does 
a weaker labor market in Canada result in attracting fewer skilled immigrants so that 
overall skill levels of arriving cohorts of immigrants are reduced? And, by extension, 
does a weaker labor market in the United States (a substitute destination), ceteris paribus, 
lead to an increase in the overall skill levels of immigrants selecting to come to Canada? 
  We want to estimate the effects of policy driver variables (appearing as 
independent variables) on the general skill characteristics of landing immigrants (as the 
dependent variables). Observations are individual arriving immigrants, so the regressions 
are estimated over microdata points. While we have observations over time, each data 
point is a landed immigrant at the year of their landing (i.e., their arrival on Canadian 
soil). So the observations occur in annual cross-sections and do not have a panel or 
longitudinal dimension. Unfortunately, the database does not record the actual Point 
System total score or sub-scores awarded to each principal applicant. Since different 
regions have experienced different degrees of labor market tightness and economic 
growth, we characterize immigrant arrivals by region of intended residence in their first 
year in Canada (with six regions: Atlantic, Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba/ Saskatchewan, 
Alberta, and British Columbia). 
 
IV.2 Regression  Specification and Estimation Groups 
The specification estimated, then, includes a time trend to pick up underlying net trend 
effects, the total inflow of immigrants in a year (in thousands), the Economic class share 
of total inflow (out of 100), and the maximum points allocated by the Point System to the   25
respective skill measure for that equation as a share of the required pass mark (out of 
100). These three “test variables” are used to test hypotheses 1-3, respectively. The 
regressions for all immigrants also include admission class dummy variables (with 
Economic class as the default). The regressions also involve six destination region 
dummies (with Ontario as the default) and seven source region dummies. The default 
source region is English-speaking countries (consisting of the U.S., U.K., Ireland, South 
Africa, Australia and New Zealand). Finally, in order to pick up business cycle effects on 
immigrant skill outcomes, the regression specification further includes the Canadian 
annual unemployment rate (for 25-54 year olds from the CANSIM website) as a proxy 
for labor market tightness and phase of the business cycle. Since potential immigrants 
may view the United States and Canada as substitute alternative destinations, the 
specification also includes a U.S. unemployment rate (annual for all persons in the U.S. 
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics website).
3 These two variables represent a test of the 
fourth hypothesis above.
4 
A further consideration in interpreting the regression results and hypothesis tests 
is to ask the question: to whom do the hypotheses apply? When Economic class 
immigration occurs, one person (the principal applicant – typically the person in the 
family unit who is expected to score highest on the Point System scale) gets reviewed 
under the Point System, and if the review is successful the whole family unit arrives and 
all the family members are classified as Economic class immigrants. On average over the 
period covered, there were 2.3 arrivals per principal applicant (PA). But as illustrated in 
Figure 8, this ratio of arrivals per PA has not been at all constant over the period and has 
been generally higher in the 1990s than in the 1980s. Thus, when the share of Economic   26
class immigrants goes up, there are several changes that can occur: (i) there is a shifting 
weight towards higher-average-skilled immigrants, and (ii) the average skill levels of 
arrivals  within the Economic class category may change as well. Some simple 
mathematics can clarify what is going on. 
  Let S denote skill level in some dimension and w the proportion that Economic 
class immigrants are in total immigration. Then the average skill level across all 
immigrants is the weighted average of average skill levels among Economic class 
immigrants (EC) and non-Economic class immigrants (NEC): 
E(S) = w · E(S | EC, w) + (1-w) · E(S | NEC)                   (1) 
where we assume that the average skill level within the Economic class is a function of 
w. Then it is simple to calculate that the overall skill effect of increasing the Economic 
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The first term in square brackets Jasso et al. (1997) label as the “composition effect” and 
is unambiguously expected to be positive as we have seen that average skill levels are 
higher among Economic class immigrants than for non-Economic class immigrants. The 
second term of the expression may be called the “average skill effect” within the 
Economic class of increasing the share of Economic class immigration. Since total levels 
of immigration are being held constant in the regressions, an increase in w corresponds to 
an increase in the total number of Economic class arrivals – including both PAs and their 
accompanying family members. It is also important to note that all terms in the above   27
expression are readily estimable. The sign of the average skill effect is ambiguous a 
priori as arguments could be made for it to go either way.
5 
  There are several outcomes from this derivation. First, the effect of Economic 
share on overall average skill levels is a priori ambiguous and depends on two effects, 
only one of which can be signed a priori. It becomes an empirical matter what the sign of 
the second effect is and which of the two effects dominates. Second, in order to estimate 
and evaluate the average skill effect and to better test hypotheses two and three, we need 
to rerun the regressions on the group of Economic class immigrants. 
  Third, we can refine the reasoning in equations (1) and (2) further to view 
principal applicants – the ones who are actually reviewed under the Point System – as the 
subgroup through which the average skill effect operates. To illustrate, let 
E(S | EC,w) = p · E(S | PA,w) + (1-p) · E(S | NPA)                 (3) 
where the first expectation on the right-hand side of (3) is the average skill level of 
principal applicants (possibly a function of w as well), the second expectations term is the 
average skill level of non-PAs within the Economic class of immigrants, and p is the 
proportion of PAs among Economic class immigrants. Now substitute this result into 
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Again the first term is our composition effect and the second term is an alternative 
expression for the average skill effect. In this case, though, the latter is estimated through 
running regressions on the subgroup of principal applicants. Note also that principal 
applicants are the most directly affected and thus the most appropriate group on which to   28
test hypothesis on the effects of changing Point System weights. Indeed, one can refine 
the statement of hypothesis three now to: does an increase in the Point System weight on 
some skill dimension (eg., educational attainment) have the desired effect on raising the 
average skill level in this dimension among principal applicants? 
  Fourth, the expressions in equations (2) and (4) provide the basis for indirect 
estimation of overall skill effects on immigrants as a whole. The set of all immigrants 
includes a great deal of compositional shifts and heterogeneity, and these shifts and 
heterogeneity may make it difficult to tease out a reliable (direct) estimate of skill effects 
on immigrants as a whole. Using equations (2) and (4), we can obtain possibly much 
more reliable indirect estimates of these effects from the regression results estimated on 
the more homogeneous and more skill-based sub-groups of Economic class immigrants 
and of the principal applicants themselves. These samples are smaller than for all 
immigrants, but their results are expected to be much cleaner and provide more clear-cut 
tests of several of the hypotheses. 
  The upshot of this discussion is that we will provide regression results for three 
sets of immigrants: for all immigrants for Economic class immigrants, and for principal 
applicant immigrants. Different immigrant groups are relevant to examining and testing 
different hypotheses.  
 
V.  Regression Results of Policy Drivers on Immigrant Skill Dimensions 
This section presents the regression results for our standard specification. The regressions 
are estimated (by OLS) for each of three groups of immigrants.
6 The all immigrants 
group consists of all adult immigrants aged 20 or more at time of landing/arrival. The age   29
restriction is necessary since the CLD database does not provide skill attributes for 
immigrant children. The number of observations in this group is about 2.7 million. The 
Economic class group consists of all Economic class immigrants and their dependants 
who are age 20 or more at arrival, and this amounts to about 1.2 million observations. 
Then the principal applicants group consists of those Economic class immigrants (age 20 
or over) who filed the application for landed immigrant status and hence were evaluated 
through the Point System. This group accounts for about 750-760 thousand observations 
(depending on what skill characteristics are reported). 
 
V.1  Effects on Educational Attainment 
Regression results for years of education as the dependent variable, estimated across 
arriving immigrants, are presented in Table 6. Results for all immigrants appear in the 
first column, results for Economic class immigrants appear in the middle column, and 
results for principal applicants are reported in the third column. For the education 
regressions in this section, an extra regressor is added – a dummy variable which takes a 
value of one for the years 1993 on in order to capture extra points awarded for a 
university degree (beyond simply years of education). Figures in parentheses are OLS 
standard errors and asterisks indicate coefficient significance at the 1 (**) or 5(*) percent 
levels. Given the large numbers of observations, most coefficients are highly statistically 
significant. 
  The results for all immigrants include admission class dummies. The three 
negative coefficients show that, relative to Economic class immigrants (the default   30
category), Family class immigrants have lower average education levels by about 2.6 
years and Humanitarian class arrivals have lower education levels by about 2.0 years. 
  The coefficient signs and magnitudes, on the whole, are fairly similar across the 
three immigrant groups. The time trend results indicate that average levels of education 
have been rising by about 1.8-2.0 years per decade across all three groups. Higher overall 
immigration levels (holding Economic vs non-Economic class composition constant) 
reduce average education levels across all groups. Raising the total immigration by 100 
thousand per year is estimated to reduce Economic class average education level by 0.31 
years and overall immigrant education levels by 0.31 years as well, equivalent to about 
one and a half years of upward trend. These results support the first hypothesis above. 
  Within the Economic class and principal applicant groups, an increase in the 
Economic class share has significant positive effects, with strongest effects on principal 
applicants. A rise in the Economic class share of total immigration (holding constant the 
total inflow) by 10 percentage points is estimated to yield a 0.13 year increase in the 
average level of education of principal applicants. This is not consistent with the 
argument that bringing in more PAs (for a given total inflow) will attract more 
“marginal” candidates and hence reduce average education levels among either PAs 
themselves or among Economic class immigrants as a whole. Rather, this result is 
consistent with a view that, in order to bring in more qualified PAs, the immigration 
officers of CIC put in greater effort and more administrative resources are applied to the 
objective, with the outcome that CIC ends up bringing in particularly well skilled PAs, 
thus raising average within-class skill levels – what might be called traditional 
occupational gap-filling applied to skill levels rather than occupations.   31
  One can now use these results to evaluate expressions (2) and (4) of the previous 
section and obtain an indirect estimate of an increase in the Economic share on average 
education levels for all immigrants as a whole, based on the more homogeneous and 
more reliable estimates in columns two and three of the table. On average over the 1980-
2001 period, the composition effect for years of education is (11.77 – 10.38 =) 1.39 years. 
Over the same period, avg (w) = 0.4572 and avg (p) = 0.4339. Hence the average skill 
effect is estimated as 0.30 years based on the Economic class regression or 0.27 years 
based on the principal applicant regression. The average skill effect is estimated to be 
positive, but of only secondary size compared to the dominant composition effect. Thus 
raising the Economic class share by one percentage point (holding total inflow constant) 
is indirectly estimated to raise overall average education levels across all immigrants by 
(1.39 + 0.30 or 0.27) / 100 = .0169 or .0166, and thus a 10 point increase in the Economic 
class share raises average education levels by 0.17 years – based on either the Economic 
class or PA regression results. This result supports the second hypothesis above. If one 
compares this estimate to that of the total inflow effect in the all-immigrants regression, 
one finds that increasing the total immigrant inflow by 100 thousand arrivals a year 
would require about an 18 percentage point rise (-.31/.17) in the Economic class share to 
counterbalance. This is a pretty substantial effect. 
  The consequences of increasing the maximum education points (as a share of the 
total pass mark) in the Point System schedule are very much as expected in all three 
regressions, with strongest effects for principal applicants and weakest or most diluted 
results for all immigrants as a whole. Raising education points by 10 percentage points is 
estimated to increase principal applicants’ average education level by 0.35 years,   32
Economic class immigrants’ levels by 0.29 years, and overall immigrants by 0.14 years. 
These results thus support the third hypothesis above. While the education 93 dummy 
came out with “wrong” sign for all immigrants, it showed up with strong positive effects 
for Economic class immigrants and PAs, with again the effect on PAs’ education levels 
being substantially stronger – as one would expect. 
  Business cycle effects show up with very consistent and robust estimates across 
all three immigrant groups. Recessions in Canada reduce average education levels of 
arriving immigrants as fewer Economic class arrivals occur, but also the average skill 
levels of those who do arrive decline. Conversely, recessions in the United States have 
the effect of raising average education levels of immigrants to Canada, both for 
immigrants as a whole as well as for principal applicants themselves. These results thus 
support the fourth hypothesis above. Interestingly, the effect of U.S. recessions is about 
twice as strong as that for Canadian recessions. Immigration human capital to Canada 
appears to be very sensitive to the attractiveness of the U.S. economic environment. 
  Across regions of residence of arriving immigrants, the Atlantic provinces seem 
to attract immigrants with the highest average education level, while Quebec and the 
Territories attract those with the lowest average education level (even controlling for 
source region). This pattern shows up more strongly among principal applicants and 
Economic class immigrants as a whole. While these differences are much smaller than 
those across region of origins of immigrants, nonetheless the net difference in average 
level of education between PAs settling in Atlantic provinces and in Quebec is about one 
full year of education.   33
  Across source region of immigrants, the average level of education of principal 
applicants is highest among PAs arriving from Africa and the Middle East, and lowest 
among PAs from Latin America and Other Pacific. In this case, though, the net difference 
in average level of education between PAs arriving from Africa and the Middle East and 
from Other Pacific is 2.9 years of education. For immigrants as a whole, the net 
difference in average level of education between arrivals from Other Pacific and from 
English-speaking source countries is also 2.9 years of education. The mix of immigrants 
by country or region of origin clearly has important effects on average skill levels of the 
landed immigrants. 
  Further results on educational attainment are found in Table 7 on the proportion 
of immigrants with a university degree at time of arrival. These equations are estimated 
as linear probability models.
7 The set up of the table is the same as the previous one. The 
results are very much in accord with those on years of education, so a much briefer 
overview is provided. Again, Economic class immigrants have a higher proportion of 
university graduates than other immigrant classes by 23-27 percentage points. Other 
things being held constant, there has been a net upward trend in the proportion of 
immigrants with a university degree of 2-3 percent a year – again strongest for principal 
applicants. A higher total inflow is estimated to reduce the proportion with a university 
degree (PUD). 
  The Economic class share effect, however, shows mixed results. It is estimated to 
be significantly positive for principal applicants, not significant for Economic class 
immigrants and significantly negative for all immigrants. The composition effect in 
equations (2) and (4) is estimated to be (23.85 - 10.57 =) 13.3 percent or 0.133, so the   34
indirect estimate of the Economic class share effect on all immigrants is found to be .124 
- .145. That is, an increase in the proportion of Economic class immigrants by 10 
percentage points (holding total inflow constant) is indirectly estimated to raise the 
proportion of all immigrants with a university degree by 1.24 – 1.45 percentage points. 
  A greater emphasis on education points within the Point System increases PUD, 
with about twice as strong an effect on principal applicants as upon all immigrants as a 
whole. With respect to business cycle effects, again a higher unemployment rate in 
Canada reduces PUD, while a higher U.S. unemployment rate has the opposite effect. In 
this case though, the effects are stronger among principal applicants than for immigrants 
as a whole, and the strengths of the effects are about the same for the Canadian and U.S. 
unemployment rates. Evidently, the difference in the Canada–U.S. cyclical effects 
operates more strongly on the relatively less educated immigrants (i.e., comparing the 
cyclical results between Tables 6 and 7). Finally, the pattern of regional effects – both 
region of origin and region of settlement – is pretty much similar to what was found in 
Table 6 for years of education. 
 
 V.2  Effects on Age at Time of Arrival 
Regression results for age (at time of landing) as the dependent variable are presented in 
Table 8, again in the same format as before. Across the different skill dimensions of 
regressions, those for age at time of arrival are the least well fitting in terms of R
2
s. This 
may reflect that age is playing several roles as an index of skill and these pull in different 
directions – adaptability favours youth and younger workers while work experience 
effects may favour middle- or later-middle age. It may reflect that age points within the   35
Canadian Point System are not one-sided as points are reduced for applicants on either 
side of the prime 21-49 year age interval. Furthermore, the age distribution of immigrants 
has changed considerably over the period covered as there has been a considerable shift 
from Family class emphasis (whose arrivals are on average relatively older) toward an 
Economic class focus (whose arrivals are relatively younger). Nonetheless, virtually all 
the regression coefficients in all three equations are highly statistically significant and the 
overall fits (or regression F-statistics) are highly significant as well. 
  From the regression estimated on all immigrants, one can see refugees are, on net, 
the youngest on average across admission classes (about 1.4 years younger than the 
default group, Economic class immigrants) and the Family class arrivals are on average 
the oldest (6.5 years older than the Economic class group). The conflicting signs of the 
trend coefficients attest to several different factors on-going. On the one hand, the shift 
towards greater focus on Economic class immigrants and away from an emphasis on 
family reunification has had the effect of reducing the overall average age of immigrants 
(by about 0.8 years per decade), while at the same time the average age of principal 
applicants has been rising (by about 0.5 years per decade) as greater skill acquisition – 
through years of education and work experience – takes more time to acquire. 
  If younger immigrants are more desireable, then increasing the total inflow of 
immigrants is estimated to result in raising the average age of principal applicants as 
more marginal (i.e., older) candidates are brought in. Increasing the total inflow level by 
100 thousand is estimated to raise the average age of PAs by 0.8 years. This effect, 
however, is attenuated as one moves to broader immigrant groups, so that for immigrants 
as a whole it actually turns out slightly negative. A reduction in average age for all   36
immigrants would not seem to make sense here. But as principal applicants get older, 
they are likely to have more accompanying dependants who make it just above the 20-
year old lower-bound age cut-off for inclusion in the database, hence lowering overall 
average age. 
  Since Economic class immigrants are on average (31.55 – 26.26 =) 5.29 years 
younger than non-Economic class immigrants, one would expect that increasing the 
Economic class share of total immigration would reduce the overall average age of 
immigrants as a whole. Indeed, the composition effect or first term in expressions (2) and 
(4) is precisely this mean age differential of –5.29 years. The average skill effect of 
increasing the Economic class share is negative for both principal applicants and the 
Economic class group as a whole, consistent with bringing in “more skilled” (i.e., 
younger) immigrants, analogous to the finding for education in the previous section. The 
average skill effect in expressions (2) and (4) is thus estimated as between -0.26 (based 
on the Economic class regression) and –0.48 (from the PA regression). Again, the 
average skill effect is far secondary to the basic composition effect. Combining them 
yields the indirect estimate that increasing the Economic class share of total immigration 
by 10 percentage points yields a reduction in the average age of all immigrants of 0.56 – 
0.58 years. The effect on average of all immigrants of increasing the Economic class 
share by 10 percentage points is thus almost exactly twice as strong as that of raising the 
total immigrant inflow rate by 100 thousand arrivals per year. Alternatively stated, the 
latter effect is equivalent in its effect on overall average age of all immigrants to 
increasing the Economic class share by 5.0 – 5.2 percentage points.   37
  As more weight is allocated to points for age within the Point System schedule 
with the objective of favouring younger principal applicants, as expected average age of 
PAs declines. Increasing the points allocated to age by 10 percentage points is estimated 
to reduce average age of principal applicants by 0.17 years. Again, this reduction doesn’t 
show up for all immigrants. But again, this may reflect that younger PAs have younger 
children who are less likely to be included in the estimation sample for all immigrants 
because of its age-20 lower bound, hence there would be a reduction in who would 
otherwise be young accompanying immigrants. Indeed, this lower age bound inclusion 
criterion for our samples is likely the sources of more anomalous results for the age 
regressions over all immigrants than for the other skill dimension regressions over all 
immigrants. Furthermore, if Economic class immigrants are getting younger on average 
while the age weighting effect results in the average age rising among all immigrants, 
then the average age of non-Economic class immigrants must be rising. This could occur 
if a greater emphasis on bringing in younger principal applicants results in families who 
might otherwise be admitted as Economic class immigrants now applying and becoming 
admitted under the Family class category, thus raising the average age on non-Economic 
class immigrants. 
  Business cycles also have a quite major effect on average age of immigrants. A 
higher Canadian unemployment rate brings in older immigrants across all three 
immigrant groups and a higher U.S. unemployment rate makes Canada relatively more 
attractive and brings in younger principal applicants and Economic class immigrants. 
Interestingly here, the Canadian unemployment rate effect turns out stronger than that for 
the U.S., which is opposite to what was found for education. Even more interesting is the   38
magnitude of these effects. A one percentage point increase in the Canadian 
unemployment rate is estimated to reduce principal applicants’ average level of education 
by 0.10 years (see Table 6), while the same increase is found to raise the average age of 
PAs by 0.51 years. A one percentage point increase in the U.S. unemployment rate is 
estimated to increase PAs’ average level of education by 0.20 years, but to reduce PAs’ 
average age by 0.39 years. So the business cycle effects operate much more strongly on 
the age of arriving principal applicants than on their education levels – by about five 
times with respect to Canadian unemployment rate and by about two times for the U.S. 
unemployment rate. Again the results are much stronger for principal applicants than for 
immigrants as a whole. 
  With respect to the region-of-settlement controls, the Atlantic provinces stand out, 
and to a lesser extent British Columbia, as attracting older immigrants, while Ontario (the 
most prosperous province over the period covered) attracts the youngest principal 
applicants and Economic class immigrants. Younger non-Economic class immigrants, 
however, evidently settle in a number of other regions as well, thus yielding a rather 
different pattern of coefficient signs for all immigrants as a whole. With respect to 
region-of-origin controls, the youngest immigrants come from the Other Pacific region, 
while the oldest come from China, Hong Kong and Taiwan. Relatively young non-
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V.3  Effects on Official Language Fluency 
Regression results for English or French language fluency as the dependent variable
8 are 
presented in Table 9. From the admission class coefficients, one can see that fluency in 
either official language is highest on net among Economic class immigrants and 
markedly lower for Family class immigrants (by 26 percent) and lower still for refugees 
(by almost 35 percent). 
  While the trend is towards greater fluency in an official tongue on net among 
immigrants as a whole (by about 3 percentage points per decade), among principal 
applicants and their dependants interestingly the trend on net has been downwards (by 
about 5 percentage points per decade) over the period covered. Obviously, non-Economic 
class immigrants on net are becoming more fluent in either English or French. Note, 
however, these trends are net of the positive effect of the increasing weight put on 
language fluency within the Point System. 
  Increasing the total inflow of immigrants also has mixed but very small effects on 
language fluency. An increased inflow of 100 thousand arrivals per year is estimated to 
reduce the language fluency rate for immigrants as a whole by 1.1 percentage points. The 
finding of a positive effect on principal applicants, however, is anomalous and different 
from results for the other two skill dimensions where an increased inflow had the effect 
of reducing average skill levels of principal applicants. But the magnitude is quite small 
at less than one percentage point for a 100 thousand increase in overall immigration 
levels. 
  An increase in the Economic class share of the inflow is found to have a fairly 
strong positive effect on language fluency across all three immigrant groups. A direct   40
estimate predicts that a 10 percentage point increase in the Economic class share (holding 
total inflow constant) will raise fluency rates among all immigrants by 2.5 percentage 
points. If one calculates an indirect estimate using equations (2) and (4), one finds a 
composition effect of (64.3 – 49.1 =) 15.2 percent or 0.152 and an average skill effect of 
0.0018 – 0.0007, so an indirect estimate of 0.153 – 0.154. Again the composition effect 
clearly dominates. Thus an indirect estimate of a 10 point increase in the Economic class 
share of total immigration is to raise overall fluency rates by 1.5 percentage points. This 
is comparable to the magnitude of the analogous effect on the proportion arriving with a 
university degree. Since the total inflow effect on language fluency is so weak, however, 
the effect of raising the inflow rate by 100 thousand is equivalent in magnitude to raising 
the Economic class share by only 2.5 percentage points. 
  Increasing the maximum language points (as a share of the total pass mark) in the 
Point System schedule is associated with an increase in official language fluency for both 
principal applicants and for immigrants as a whole. Raising language points by 10 
percentage points is estimated to increase principal applicants’ average language fluency 
rate by 0.9 points, a rather weak effect. 
  Business cycle effects again turn out to be highly statistically significant, but 
surprisingly they are exactly opposite in sign to what was found earlier for the other skill 
dimensions. In this case, recessions in Canada are estimated to increase average level of 
language fluency, while recessions in the United States have the opposite effect. When 
separate regressions are run for English fluency and for French fluency, the above pattern 
of unemployment rate effects is replicated in the English language fluency results, but not 
in the French language fluency results (see Tables 10 and 11). The current results in   41
Table 9 are thus consistent with the behaviour that, when the Canadian unemployment 
rate is high, immigrants view English proficiency as a greater necessity for finding a job 
or a greater priority than otherwise, and when the U.S. unemployment rate is high there is 
less of a need if they are coming to Canada. Why this should be the case, though, is 
puzzling. One possible explanation is that those applying  with English language fluency 
may be more confident in immigrating in recessions because of their language advantage 
over other immigrants. Another possible explanation is that, in recessions, immigration 
officers may reduce the numbers admitted – since they do have discretion in awarding 
points in the case of language fluency – who lack English language fluency, and in 
expansions they ease up.
9 
  With respect to region of settlement, the most fluent go to Ontario, the Territories, 
and (in the case of all immigrants) the Atlantic provinces. The provinces receiving 
immigrants with the lowest degree of official language fluency are Manitoba/ 
Saskatchewan, British Columbia and Alberta – all from western Canada. With respect to 
region of origin, obviously the source region with the highest degree of official language 
fluency is the (default) set of English-speaking countries. The regions providing the least 
fluent immigrants are China, Hong Kong and Taiwan, Other European, and (in the case 
of all immigrants) India, Sri Lanka and Pakistan. 
  Since different patterns may be at work for immigrants fluent in French rather 
than English, the above regressions were rerun separately for English proficiency and for 
French proficiency. The results appear in Tables 10 and 11, respectively. The results for 
English language fluency are virtually the same as already discussed in Table 9. The only 
differences are the expected ones that immigrants with only English language fluency   42
were less likely to settle in Quebec and more likely to settle in the Atlantic provinces, and 
they were (obviously) more likely to have come from English-speaking countries and less 
likely to have come from Latin America, Other European countries, and Africa and the 
Middle East. 
  The results for French language fluency appearing in Table 11 do show some 
marked differences from those in the previous two tables. The expected differences 
indeed show up in regional effects that immigrants with proficiency in French are much 
more likely to settle in Quebec and much less likely to come from English-speaking 
countries (and hence more likely to come from everywhere else). There is also a net 
positive trend in French fluency across all three immigrant groups including principal 
applicants. Also the language points effect, while positive, is not statistically significant 
for either principal applicants or all Economic class immigrants. But the most dramatic 
difference is that the coefficient signs for the business cycle effects on French proficiency 
are opposite to those for English-language proficiency. That is, in times of recessions in 
Canada, French-language fluency declines just as other skill dimensions also fall off; and 
in times of U.S. recessions, French-language fluency of immigrants to Canada increases 
just as other skill dimensions of Canadian immigrants also improve. So the apparent 
anomaly lies in the English-language fluency response to business cycle fluctuations. 
 
V.4  Cross-Weight Effects of Skill Points 
In each of the above regressions, only the Point System skill weight corresponding to 
each of the dependent variables was included. But it is possible that changing the weight 
on some other Point System skill component could have an effect as well in these   43
reduced-form regressions. For example, since highly educated foreigners are probably 
more likely to be proficient in English (or French) than their less educated compatriots, 
raising the Point System weight on higher levels of education could potentially have the 
side effect of raising the official language fluency of arriving immigrants as well. Such an 
impact will be referred to as a cross-weight effect, in contrast to the own-weight effects 
discussed in the previous sets of regressions. Accordingly, all the principal applicant and 
Economic class regressions have been rerun so that each includes all three Point System 
skill weight variables. Thus each regression will allow for both an own-weight effect as 
well as two cross-weight effects. This will potentially allow us not only to examine the 
relative strengths of the own-weight and cross-weight effects, but also to evaluate the 
degree of complementarity or substitutability among the three skill weight variables and 
to evaluate possible trade-offs in shifting weights allocated to these alternative skill 
dimensions within the Canadian Point System. 
  Results for these own-weight and cross-weight effects are presented in Tables 12 
(on the education outcomes of immigrants), 13 (on the age outcomes), and 14 (on 
language fluency outcomes). Only the own- and cross-weight effects are presented; the 
rest of the regression results show virtually no differences from what has already been 
discussed. One should note, as an aside, that the questions being asked here demand a lot 
from the data. While there are large numbers of cross-sectional observations in the CLD 
database, identification of the own- and cross-weight effects comes from a relatively few 
time series changes in the Point System weighting scheme and pass mark for admission. 
Nonetheless, most of the weight coefficients turn out significant at least at the five 
percent level.   44
  Inspection of the coefficients in Tables 12-14 reveals, first of all, that the skill 
weight effects are, in all cases, stronger for principal applicants than for Economic class 
immigrants as a whole, very much as one would expect. Also, own-weight increases have 
skill-enhancing effects (positive for education and language fluency, and negative for 
age) in all cases except for French language fluency – which is a change from Table 11 
where only the language fluency skill weight was included.  
  A ten percentage point increase in maximum points awarded for education is 
estimated to raise principal applicants’ average years of education by 1.4 years and their 
proportion with a university degree by about 13 ½ percentage points. But it also raises 
average English language fluency by 12 ½ percentage points. It has no statistically 
significant effect on French fluency rates. And it increases average age of principal 
applicants by 0.76 years as greater education takes longer to get and thus results in older 
applicants on average. Raising maximum points for age by 10 percentage points results in 
average age of principal applicants declining by 0.46 years, but average years of 
education also declining by 0.65 years (as younger arrivals generally have lower 
education levels), the proportion with a university degree declining by 2.4 percentage 
points, the English fluency rate declining by 20 percentage points and the French fluency 
rate going up by 2.6 percentage points. Finally, raising maximum points for official 
language fluency by 10 percentage points is estimated to increase English fluency rates 
by 2.7 percentage points, reduce the French fluency rate by 2.3 percentage points, reduce 
principal applicants’ average age by 1.2 years, reduce their average years of education by 
0.76 years, and reduce their proportion with a university degree by 7.9 percentage points. 
All three skill factors have relatively strong effects on the age of principal applicants and   45
relatively weak effects on their official language fluency rates. Education and language 
fluency weights have relatively strong effects on the educational attainment of PA 
arrivals, while the age weight shows up with a relatively weak effect. In general, the 
strongest skill weight effects are to be had on educational attainment and age, while the 
weakest effects occur on language fluency outcomes. 
  The estimates for own- and cross-weight effects show that the education and 
language fluency outcomes are complements with respect to the education points weight. 
Education and age outcomes are substitutes with respect to both the age points weight 
and the language fluency points weight. Among the three skill dimension outcomes, the 
clearest trade-offs occur for educational attainment where the own-weight effect strongly 
improves the average education outcomes while the two cross-weight effects turn out to 
have fairly strong education-reducing impacts. Trade-offs in the other two skill outcome 
dimensions are not at all clear cut. 
  Again, wariness of these cross-weight estimates should be expressed. Three 
weight coefficients are being estimated from only four sets of policy changes over the 
period covered. The estimated effects seem unreasonably large. In the age and language 
fluency outcomes, the own-weight effects are dominated by the cross-weight effects, 
which does not seem to make much sense. In light of this likely multicollinearity, these 
results are not highlighted in the summary of main findings in the next section. 
 
VI.  Conclusions: Lessons for U.S. Immigration Policy 
Making predictions or prescriptions for one country based on the experience of another 
country is always tentative at best. Nonetheless, Canada has had considerable experience   46
over several decades with application of a Point System on skill-evaluated or Economic 
class immigrants. The unique Canadian Landings Database used in this paper also 
provides an unusual opportunity to test empirically a number of hypotheses about the 
effectiveness of such a system. Relative strength of the different policy levers is set out in 
Table 15 which expresses the various policy effects all in terms of percent changes in the 
different skill outcome variables. The total inflow percentages refer to raising the total 
inflow of immigrants by 100 thousand persons per year. The proportion of immigrants 
arriving under the Economic class refers to increasing the Economic class share by 10 
percentage points. The Point System own-weights refers to the effect of increasing the 
maximum skill points for a given skill dimension by 10 percentage points relative to the 
pass mark on that respective skill. 
  Five main conclusions arise from the empirical analysis of this paper and that may 
provide some useful input to the current U.S. debate. First, with respect to total 
immigration rates, it has been found that increasing overall annual inflows of immigrants 
lowers the average skill levels of the arriving cohort. This reduction in skill levels occurs 
most strongly for educational attainment of arriving immigrants, more moderately with 
respect to age of arriving immigrants, and very weakly (if at all) for official language 
fluency of immigrants. For example, raising total inflow levels by 100 thousand per year 
(or by about 35 percent from recent levels) is estimated to reduce average years of 
education of Economic class immigrants by 2.6 percent, to increase their average age by 
1.7 percent, and to reduce the average rate of English or French language fluency by 0.2 
percent.   47
  Second, for a given level of total inflow, increasing the proportion of skill-
evaluated or Economic class immigrants – at least in the way they are designated in the 
Canadian system – is found to raise the average skill levels of principal applicants and 
Economic class immigrants and, by inference, of all immigrants as a whole. In making 
the latter inference, the so-called “composition effect” set out in equations (2) and (4) is 
clearly the dominant factor. Increasing the Economic class share in total immigration has 
its strongest effect on official language fluency of arriving cohorts, has a significant 
effect on average education levels, and has a moderate effect on average age of arriving 
immigrants. For example, raising the Economic class share of total immigration by 10 
percentage points is estimated to increase average levels of education of all immigrants 
by 1.5 percent, to reduce their average age by 2.0 percent, and to increase their official 
language fluency rates by about 2.7 percent. 
  Third, it is found that business cycle effects on skill level outcomes of immigrant 
cohorts to Canada are highly statistically significant, and generally operate so that higher 
Canadian unemployment rates reduce average skill levels of arriving immigrants (with 
the exception of English language fluency rates), and higher U.S. unemployment rates 
have the opposite effect (with the same exception). Such business cycle effects appear to 
operate more strongly through average age and education levels of principal applicants. 
  Fourth, with respect to the operation of the Canadian Point System itself, it has 
been found that increasing the weights on specific skill dimensions within the Point 
System schedule indeed has the intended effect of raising average skill levels in this 
dimension among arriving principal applicants. Basically, the Point System does appear 
to work as it is intended. The strongest effects occur for education, moderately strong for   48
language fluency of immigrants, and rather weak effects occur on age of arriving 
immigrants. For example, if there is a 10 percentage point increase in the weight 
allocated to a specific skill measure within the Point System (with no cross-weight 
effects), the result is that the average years of education of principal applicants are 
estimated to increase by 2.7 percent, their average age declines by 0.6 percent, and their 
average official language fluency rate goes up by 1.2 percent. 
  This study has identified three broad sets of policy tools for bringing about 
improvements in immigrant outcomes. One is a change in the total rate of inflow of 
immigrants, the second is a change in the Economic class share of total immigration, and 
the third is various changes in the Point System weights allocated to various skill 
dimensions. Correspondingly, the study has examined three sets of benchmark changes in 
these policy tools: increasing the total inflow rate by 100 thousand immigrants per year, 
raising the Economic class share by 10 percentage points, and increasing each of the 
three Point System skill weights by 10 percentage points. When all is said and done, then, 
which of the three major sets of policy tools appears to be most effective in bringing 
about desired changes in the skill outcomes of arriving immigrants? It turns out there is 
no simple across-the-board rule. Again referring to Table 15, it can be seen that the 
proportion of Economic class immigrants seems to have the strongest across-the-board 
impact.
10 The rise in the proportion of Economic class immigrants, though, would be 
expected to gradually increase the effect of changing Point System weights on average 
immigrant skills as a whole. The education outcome variable stands out as being the most 
responsive among the three skill dimensions. In general, the Point System appears to 
have strong effects on education outcomes of arriving immigrants, moderate effects on   49
language fluency outcomes, and rather weak effects on age outcomes of arriving 
immigrants.
11 Obviously, further analysis of the issues raised in this study will help refine 
the design of an effective immigration policy for a complex and dynamic economy.   50
Endnotes 
* The authors would like to thank, without implicating, participants of workshops at 
University of Illinois at Chicago, Queen’s University, University of Western Ontario, and 
the Policy Research Initiative in Ottawa for their many thoughtful comments, as well as 
Professors Michael Abbott, Paul Miller, and Barry Chiswick for extensive feedback and 
suggestions on this work. 
 
1 Ideally, one would like to estimate these effects across several leading immigrant-
receiving countries jointly, say as a set of seemingly unrelated regression equations. But 
unfortunately, comparable data for other countries were not available. 
 
2 Unfortunately, the CLD database does not include the Point System score (either by 
skill dimension or in total) awarded to each arriving principal applicant. Nor does it 
include a variable for pre-arrival work experience even though this is a skill dimension 
rewarded by the Point System. The CLD values for arriving immigrants refer to 
information at time of landing rather than at time of original application. 
 
3 Since the regressions already include a time trend variable, this effectively transforms 
the two raw unemployment rate variables into trend-adjusted cyclical indicators. 
 
4 Data limitations prevent us from also including in the reduced-form skill-outcome 
regressions such additional potential regressors as the federal immigration department’s 
budget constraints and immigration policy changes in alternative recipient countries such 
as the United States, Australia, and the European community nations. On the other hand, 
we have chosen not to include a gender dummy regressor as gender differences in skill 
outcomes are not an objective of immigration policy and are not of interest in this paper. 
 
5 Indeed, if E(S | NES) were also a function of w, then the average skill effect would 
involve the difference in the derivatives of E(S | EC, w) and E(S | NEC, w) with respect 
to w, and would be even more ambiguous. 
 
6 Further empirical work could take account that total immigration flows and possibly the 
Economic class share are not completely exogenous, but reflect in part immigrants’ 
choices. Also the regression errors are likely not fully i.i.d. and may have clustering 
characteristics in the time-series dimension (associated with introducing macro-economic 
regressors in cross-sectional regressions) meaning that OLS-reported standard errors are 
underestimated. 
 
7 Again, estimating the regressions by OLS rather than by probit or logit maximum 
likelihood methods means that standard errors are not fully correct in the presence of 
heteroscedasticity due to the 0-1 nature of the dependent variables. But since conditional 
means are not close to the 0-1 bounds and the numbers of observations are so large, we 
opted for the simpler linear estimation technique. 
 
8 See endnote 7.   51
 
9 We wish to thank Professor Weili Ding at Queen’s for these suggested explanations. 
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where ws is the maximum Point System weight allocated to skill dimension S, the 
implied relative effects on all immigrant mean skill levels of the figures in the last row of 
Table 15 are 0.5%, 0.1%, and 0.2% respectively. 
 
11 The reason age comes through as the least responsive of the three Point System 
variables may reflect that age captures the effects of both youth and work experience (see 
endnote 2), and hence is being pulled in conflicting directions. If the CLD reported 
information on work experience as well as age for all principal applications, these two 
separate effects being picked up by the age variable could be separately identified.   52
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Table 1 
 




Factor        ’67 ’74 ‘78 ‘86 ‘93 ’96 
 
 
Education      20 20 12 12 14 21 
 
Experience      --  --    8    8    8    9 
         
 
Specific  vocational    10 10 15 15 16 -- 
preparation 
 
Occupational  demand    15 15 15 10 10 -- 
 
Labour  market  balance    -- -- -- -- -- 10 
 
 
Age        10 10 10 10 10 13 
 
Arrange  employment    10 10 10 10 10     4 
or designated occ. 
 
 
Language      10 10 10 15 14 21 
 




1    -- -- -- 10        8  -- 
 
Relative       0/3/5+  0/3/5  5  --     –    5 
 
Destination      5 5 5 --     --  -- 
 
Total        100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Pass  Mark     50 50 50 70 67 * 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Source:  Green and Green (1999), p. 433. 
1 A discretionary allocation that can be used to control the number of persons entering over a period. 
* The pass mark varies by skill level.   58
Table 2 
Immigrant Characteristics at Landing 




 1980  1990  2000 
Education      
University –  
Post-Graduate 
.0177 


























































Total Number of 
Landings 
143,136 216,402  227,313 
 
 
Source : Calculations by the authors from the CLD data.  59
Table 3 
 
Immigrant Characteristics at Landing Level of Education:  











































49,895 95,627  133,422 
 





Immigrant Characteristics at Landing Level of Education: 1990 and 2000  
Economic Immigrants who were Principal Applicants 
(proportions) 
 
 Canada  Quebec  Ontario 
  1990 2000  1990 2000  1990  2000 





































































37,659 56,292 9,566  8,155  18,195  34,115 
 
Source : Calculations by the authors from the CLD data. 
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Table 5 







































Source : Calculations by the authors from the CLD data.   61
Table 6 
 
Years of Education Regression Results 
 











Time trend (0-21) 
 
Total inflow (in ‘000s) 
 
Economic share of inflow 
(out of 100) 
Education points as share of pass 
mark (out of 100) 
Indicator for 1993 or later 
 
Cdn. unemployment rate 
 
U.S. unemployment rate 
 
















Africa & Mid. East 
 
China, H.K. & Taiwan 
 

























































































































































































Note:  1.    Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
2.  ** and * denote significant at 1 and 5 percent levels, respectively. 
3.  The default categories are: 1) Economic class for the admission class controls, 2) resident of Ontario for the region of 
residence controls, and 3) English-speaking for the source region controls.   62
Table 7 
 
Proportion with a University Degree Regression Results 
 









Time trend (0-21) 
 
Total inflow (in ‘000s) 
 
Economic share of inflow (out of 
100) 
Education points as share of pass 
mark (out of 100) 
Indicator for 1993 or later 
 
Cdn. unemployment rate 
 
U.S. unemployment rate 
 
















Africa & Mid. East 
 
China, H.K. & Taiwan 
 




































































Less than 0.0001 
0.4092 


















































































































Note:  1.     Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
  2.     ** and * denote significant at 1 and 5 percent levels, respectively. 
3.    The default categories are: 1) Economic class for the admission class controls, 2) resident of Ontario for the region of residence 
controls, and 3) English-speaking for the source region controls. 
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  Table 8 
 



















Time trend (0-21) 
 
Total inflow (in >000s) 
 
Economic share of inflow (out of 100) 
 
Ages points as share of pass mark (out of 
100) 
Cdn. unemployment rate 
 
U.S. unemployment rate 
 
















Africa & Mid East 
 
China, H.K. & Taiwan 
 






















































































































































































Note:  1. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
2. ** and * denote significant at 1 and 5 percent levels, respectively. 
3. The default categories are: 1) Economic class for the admission class controls, 2) resident of Ontario for the region of residence 
controls, and 3) English-speaking for the source region controls. 
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  Table 9 
 




















Time trend (0-21) 
 
Total inflow (in >000s) 
 
Economic share of inflow (out of 100) 
 
Language points as share of pass mark 
(out of 100) 
Cdn. unemployment rate 
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Africa & Mid East 
 
China, H.K. & Taiwan 
 

























































































































































































Note:  1. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
2. ** and * denote significant at 1 and 5 percent levels, respectively. 
3. The default categories are: 1) Economic class for the admission class controls, 2) resident of Ontario for the region of residence 
controls, and 3) English-speaking for the source region controls.   65
Table 10 
 



















Time trend (0-21) 
 
Total inflow (in ‘000s) 
 
Economic share of inflow (out of 100) 
 
Language points as share of pass mark 
(out of 100) 
Cdn. unemployment rate 
 
U.S. unemployment rate 
 
















Africa & Mid. East 
 
China, H.K. & Taiwan 
 























































































































































































Note:  1. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
2. ** and * denote significant at 1 and 5 percent levels, respectively. 
3. The default categories are: 1) Economic class for the admission class controls, 2) resident of Ontario for the region of residence 
controls, and 3) English-speaking for the source region controls.   66
Table 11 
 



















Time trend (0-21) 
 
Total inflow (in ‘000s) 
 
Economic share of inflow (out of 100) 
 
Language points as share of pass mark 
(out of 100) 
Cdn. unemployment rate 
 
U.S. unemployment rate 
 
















Africa & Mid. East 
 
China, H.K. & Taiwan 
 






















































































































































































Note:  1. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
2. ** and * denote significant at 1 and 5 percent levels, respectively. 
3. The default categories are: 1) Economic class for the admission class controls, 2) resident of Ontario for the region of residence 
controls, and 3) English-speaking for the source region controls. 
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Table 12 
 
  Trade-Offs Between Skill Weight Effects on 
                                                           
 


































































  Trade-Offs Between Skill Weight Effects 







































Trade-Offs Between Skill Weight Effects on 
   
 




























































Relative Strength of Policy Drivers 
(absolute value of percentage changes in dependent variables) 
 
Policy Drivers Skill  Outcomes 
 ED AGE  LF (E or F) 
Total Inflow 
-  Ec. Class 
-  All Immigs. 
 
Prop. Ec. Class 
-  All Immigs. 
 
Point System Own Weights 






























1.  “Total Inflow” refers to raising total inflow of immigrants by 100 thousand persons per 
year. 
  “Prop. Ec. Class” refers to increasing the proportion of immigrants arriving under the 
Economic Class category by 10 percentage points. 
  “Point System Own Weights” refers to the effect of increasing the maximum skill points 
(within the Point System) for a given skill dimension by 10 percentage points relative to 
the Pass Mark on that respective skill. 
2.  FL (E or F) stands for language fluency in either English or French 
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Source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 1980-2004 
Figure 1






























Family Class Economic Class Refugees Others All Classes  70
Figure 2






























Africa and the Middle East Asia and Pacific South and Central America
United States Europe and the United Kingdom Total
Source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 1980-2004  71
Figure 3
The Percentage Distribution of Immigrants from Asia and Pacific by Source Country, 






























































China, People's Republic of
Source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 1980-2004  72
Source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Landings Data, 1980-2001 
Figure 4







































Percentage of New Economic Immigrants who were Principal Applicants 





















































Average Age Source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 1980-2004  75
Source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Landings Data, 1980-2001 
Figure 7




































Source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Landings Data, 1980-2001 
Figure 8








1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Year
No. of Adults per PA No. of Arrivals per PA